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This paper investigates the consequences of skill loss as a result of unemployment in an 
efficiency wage model with turnover costs and on-the-job search.  Firms are unable to 
differentiate wages and therefore prefer to hire employed searchers or unemployed 
workers who have not lost human capital.  It is shown that if some fundamental factor in 
the economy changes, this will result in a lengthy adjustment process with substantial 
long run unemployment effects.  Moreover, the model is capable of generating 
persistence but the amount depends on the duration of the shock itself. 
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Most European countries suffer from a chronically high unemployment rate.  In major 
continental economies, such as Germany and France, around ten per cent of the labor 
force is unemployed.  Moreover, almost half are classified as long-term unemployed; 
i.e. they have been unemployed for twelve months or more.  Another fact is that shocks 
seem to have effects on employment long after the shocks themselves have 
disappeared.  For some reason it seems to take considerable time for European 
economies to return to their equilibrium employment levels following a shock.  This 
makes it important to try to understand how shocks, both temporary and permanent, 
affect the employment level. 
  One potential explanation of both the high level of unemployment and its 
persistent behavior following a shock is that the duration structure of unemployment 
somehow plays a role.  Many authors have argued that long term unemployed workers 
do not compete well with other searchers for the available jobs because they have lost 
the abilities that employers find attractive etc.  It is then argued that this duration 
dependence, through some mechanism, affects the wage setting in the economy, and 
thus puts upward pressure on wages.
1  One important paper that tries to formalize these 
ideas is Blanchard and Diamond (1994), who examine the effect of the composition of 
unemployment on wage determination in a matching model.  They assume that a firm 
that receives multiple job applications always picks the applicant with the shortest 
unemployment spell; a strategy they call ranking.  The wage is determined by Nash 
bargaining with the expected utility of a recently laid off worker as the threat point.  
Their main conclusion is that ranking affects the dynamics but has only minor 
permanent effects.  
In this paper the consequences of skill loss as a result of unemployment is 
studied further by analyzing a new mechanism through which the duration structure of 
unemployment affects the wage setting.  This is done by adapting the efficiency wage 
model with turnover costs and on-the-job search developed in Eriksson and Gottfries 
(2000), to a situation with two different types of unemployed workers; one group that is 
identical to employed workers and one group that is less attractive to hire.
2 
                                                 
1 Machin and Manning (1999) discuss these issues in some detail and also survey the literature. 
2 Eriksson and Gottfries (2000) focus on a situation where employers discriminate against all unemployed 
workers, and thus do not consider the duration structure of unemployment.  
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There are a number of reasons why a person who is unemployed for some time 
might lose some of his human capital.  Inability to keep up with technological advances, 
loss of social skills and loss of motivation can make it less attractive for employers to 
hire unemployed workers.  These factors should be particularly relevant for those who 
have been unemployed for a long time.  At the same time, it is hardly likely that all 
workers suffer a loss of human capital after a specific duration of unemployment (e.g. 
twelve months) but rather that the timing differs between individual workers.  Some 
workers lose skills rapidly while others maintain them for a long period of time.  To 
capture these facts the model contains two stocks of unemployed workers called short-
term unemployed (STU) and long-term unemployed (LTU), where workers in the 
second group have suffered a loss of human capital.  Every STU worker faces a constant 
risk of becoming LTU every period.   
If wages were perfectly flexible, firms should be indifferent among all job 
applicants since the wage can be adjusted to reflect differences in productivity/training 
costs.  In real world labor markets this is hardly the case, because factors such as 
fairness considerations, union influence, unemployment insurance and minimum wages 
tend to compress wages relative to productivity differentials.  In such a situation 
employers have incentives to screen job applicants for differences in 
productivity/training costs and then hire those with the best score.  Hence, unemployed 
workers that have lost some of their human capital will not get hired if the employer 
receives enough applications from other more productive searchers.  Thus, there might 
be complete discrimination of those in LTU.  At the same time there are two factors that 
might prevent this.  First, not all jobs are the same.  Differences in human capital are 
important for some jobs while they are much less important in other types of jobs.  
Second, a lot of other factors than perceived productivity/training cost differences seem 
to affect the hiring process.  To capture these facts in the model it is assumed that, for a 
fraction of the jobs, firms prefer to hire employed or STU applicants while for the rest 
of the jobs they are indifferent among all applicants.  
In this paper, a theoretical model with these features is set up.  Firms set their 
wages recognizing that labor turnover is costly since they encounter a hiring/training 
cost for every newly hired worker.  Employed workers choose whether or not to search 
based on both the wages and their job satisfaction. Those who lose their jobs become  
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STU and face a risk of becoming LTU every period.  Searchers send in job applications 
to a randomly chosen firm and firms then choose whom to hire from the pile of 
applications.  As mentioned above, firms discriminate against the LTU for a fraction of 
the available jobs.  The model is then solved for a general equilibrium solution.  Due to 
the complexity of the model numerical solution methods are used.  The model is 
calibrated with data for the German economy, and it is investigated what happens, both 
in and out of steady state, when different parameters are changed.   
The steady state analysis shows that more ranking, a higher risk to become LTU 
or more wage pressure all raise equilibrium unemployment, and that the effects are 
concentrated to the stock of LTU workers.  It is also shown that quite modest permanent 
changes in the key parameters in the model will result in very lengthy adjustment 
processes, involving substantial long run effects on the unemployment level.  For 
example, a permanent increase in the probability to become LTU - e.g. due to more 
rapid technological advances - results in a situation where the unemployment rate 
increases for years until reaching its new steady state value.  If such slow adjustment 
processes are a feature of real economies it is not surprising that economists have 
difficulties finding the structural causes of the rise in European unemployment. 
The dynamic analysis shows that temporary shocks have persistent effects, but 
the degree of persistence is quite moderate after a temporary shock to employment.  A 
prolonged shock where many workers fall into LTU generates more persistence.  Still it 
is difficult to generate the extreme amount of persistence found in time series 
regressions for employment.  However, it should be remembered that the model 
abstracts from a lot of other factors that probably also add to persistence.  
The model presented here differs in a number of ways from the analysis in 
Blanchard and Diamond (1994).  Most importantly both the wage setting assumptions 
and the mechanism through which the duration structure of unemployment affects the 
wage setting differ substantially.  First, the “quasi labor supply curve” implied by Nash 
bargaining with unemployment as the threat point is replaced by an efficiency wage 
constraint.  Second, the duration structure affects the probability that an employed 
searcher gets the job he applies for, inducing the firm to set a higher wage to keep costly 
turnover down.  In Blanchard and Diamond, the duration structure of unemployment 
affects the outside option in the wage negotiation.  It is these two facts that explain the  
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large permanent effects found in my paper.  In Blanchard and Diamond the threat point 
of the worker is affected by the fact that he runs a risk of becoming long term 
unemployed himself.  Unless the discount rate of the worker is very high this will tend 
to keep the wage from rising in the long run.  In my paper it is optimal for the firm to 
raise its wage at its own initiative following a rise in the probability to get a job for on-
the-job searchers and this has nothing to do with the utility workers get if they become 
unemployed.  Another difference is that while Blanchard and Diamond assume that the 
person with the shortest spell is always preferred, workers in this model lose human 
capital stochastically at different points in time, thus adding a bit of realism.  A second 
related paper is Pissarides (1992) who formulates a matching model with the so called 
“thin market externality”; i.e. that the supply of jobs decreases when the duration of 
unemployment increases since those who have been unemployed for a long time have 
less human capital.  In that model, an employer always hires the first unemployed 
worker he comes in contact with.  Thus, Pissarides abstracts from the behavior of the 
employer in the hiring process, the focus in this paper.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section I briefly discusses 
empirical evidence on the employability of LTU workers.   In Section II the theoretical 
model is formulated, the general equilibrium is derived and some analytical results are 
shown.  In section III the model is calibrated with German labor market data and the 
effects of parameter changes and shocks are analyzed both in steady state and 
dynamically.  Section IV concludes the discussion. 
 
I  Empirical Evidence on the Employability of LTU Workers 
Two empirical questions are particularly relevant for the present analysis.  First, does 
the probability to find regular employment decline with the duration of unemployment?  
Second, do employers discriminate against LTU workers? 
The first question is analyzed in the substantial literature on duration 
dependence.  It is fairly clear from raw data that the exit rate from unemployment 
declines with the duration of unemployment for most European economies.  However, 
                                                 
3 Other related papers are Acemoglu (1995) and Lockwood (1991) that both focus on a situation where 
employers cannot perfectly observe the productivity of unemployed workers and therefore use statistical 
discrimination against them.  Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) try to explain the high and persistent 
unemployment rates from the supply side by arguing that generous welfare benefits encourages workers, 
who have lost human capital, to demand higher wages than employers are willing to pay.  
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the more interesting question is if there exists so called true duration dependence; i.e. 
whether the probability to leave unemployment for a particular worker declines with the 
duration of his unemployment.  Essentially, this boils down to trying to eliminate 
observed as well as unobserved heterogeneity.  Machin and Manning (1999) review this 
issue in some depth.  They point out that in order to obtain identification it is normally 
necessary to make assumptions about the specific functional forms of the baseline 
hazard function and the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity.
4  Moreover, they 
conclude “it does not seem possible to identify separately the effect of heterogeneity 
from that of duration dependence without making some very strong assumptions about 
functional form which have no foundation in any economic theory”
5.  This, at the very 
least, implies that one should be very careful when interpreting results on duration 
dependence. 
Turning now to the studies that have been performed the results are mixed.  A 
particularly large number of studies have looked at data for the UK and Sweden.   
Studies of UK data normally find strong evidence of negative duration dependence 
while studies using Swedish data find only weak or even positive duration dependence.  
Studies of data for other European countries are more rare but often do not find strong 
duration dependence.  Three factors might complicate the interpretation of these results.  
The first is exits to out-of-the labor force.  A number of studies of duration dependence 
do not distinguish between exits to different states whereas others do.
6  Second, 
Pissarides (1992) emphasizes that since most studies are cross sections they use samples 
that do not contain very long durations.  This can result in a situation where too much of 
the duration dependence is classified as being due to heterogeneity.
7  Third, the 
widespread use of active labor market policy can result in breaks in unemployment 
spells and reclassification of workers as newly unemployed. 
The conclusion from the empirical studies of duration dependence seems to be 
that it still is uncertain whether this is an important problem or not.  The research so far 
shows that it is a problem in some countries, such as the UK, while it does not seem to 
                                                 
4 For example, a proportional hazard function and a gamma distribution for unobserved heterogeneity. 
5 Machin and Manning (1999) page 3111. 
6 Intuitively, it is natural to think that exits to out-of-the labor force exhibit positive duration dependence; 
e.g. discouraged worker effects. 
7 One example of a study that takes account of this is Jackman and Layard (1991) who, using time series 
data, finds strong duration dependence effects for the UK.  
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be a problem in other countries like Sweden, though the extensive use of active labor 
market policy may explain the latter finding. 
The idea that employers do view LTU as a negative factor when making hiring 
decisions has received quite strong support.
8  Bewley (1999) interviewed a large 
number of employers in the US about, among other things, their hiring procedures.  He 
finds that a quite substantial fraction view unemployment as a negative factor.  Agell 
and Lundborg (1999) find that around one forth of the Swedish employers in their 
sample view LTU as a strong negative signal.
9  Atkinson, Giles and Meager (1996) find 
similar evidence for the UK.  They emphasize that LTU, at least, makes employers 
suspicious that the worker has lost abilities like social skills and work motivation etc.
10  
Klingvall (1998) reports that around half of the Swedish employers in his survey state 
that the duration of unemployment is important when evaluating the suitability of an 
applicant.  The stated reasons are loss of skills as well as loss of social abilities.
11  
Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) cite several studies that indicate that 
unemployment causes demotivation and demoralization.  The conclusion from this 
survey and interview based literature is that employers really seem to view LTU as a 
negative worker characteristic for a substantial number of jobs and that one important 
reason for this is the belief that workers lose human capital while being unemployed. 
Does unemployment result in the loss of skills?  Though the literature on 
duration dependence does not give any clear answers, the survey based literature 
supports this idea.  Thus, it seems quite likely that unemployment results in skill loss 
and a declining probability to find a job as the duration of unemployment increases.  
This makes it important to investigate the consequences of such behavior theoretically. 
                                                 
8 It should be noted that, since employers are unlikely to admit that they avoid hiring LTU workers, the 
studies mentioned probably only gives a lower bound on the actual extent of this type of discrimination.  
9 Other studies using Swedish data are Klingvall (1998), who reports that 25 per cent of firms view 
workers who have been unemployed long unfavorably, and Behrentz and Delander (1998), who report 
that 40 per cent of firms would not choose the unemployed worker when having two otherwise similar 
applicants to choose from. 
10 An interesting finding in this study is that most respondents did not support the idea that those 
becoming unemployed are less productive than other workers but rather that it is unemployment in itself 
that makes LTU workers less attractive; i.e. this study indicates that state dependence is more important 
than heterogeneity.  
11 Not surprisingly the data indicate that the fraction of employers that view the duration of 
unemployment as an important factor is an increasing function of duration.  The function is not smooth 
but rather exhibits jumps at 3-6, 9-12 and 21-24 months.  
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II The  Model 
Events take place in discrete time and we may think of a period as one month long.  
There are a large number of workers who can be in either of three different states; 
employed, short-term unemployed (STU) or long-term unemployed (LTU).  It should be 
noted that the terms short- and long-term are not equivalent with the definitions 
normally found in labor market statistics.  In this model, a person who has become 
unemployed faces a risk of becoming LTU every period rather than automatically 
falling into LTU after six or twelve months.  At the same time the terms STU and LTU 
are appropriate since, on average, a person belonging to the LTU group has been 
unemployed a longer time and is expected to remain unemployed for a longer period of 
time.
12  The total labor force is assumed to be constant and is normalized to one.  There 
are a large number of identical firms in the economy, although the fixed number of 
firms is much smaller that the number of workers.
13  
The sequence of events in the model is the following.  At the beginning of every 
period an exogenous fraction, s, of the employed workers lose their jobs and fall into 
STU.  This fraction includes both workers quitting into unemployment and workers 
being laid off for some exogenous reason.  Firms set their wages recognizing that wages 
affect turnover.  Turnover is costly since firms have to pay a hiring/training cost for 
every newly hired worker.  Those remaining employed choose whether or not to search 
on the job considering both the wage level offered by their present employer and their 
job satisfaction. An exogenous fraction, q, of the workers in STU, including those who 
just became unemployed, then fall into LTU.  On-the-job searchers and all unemployed 
workers then submit one application to a randomly chosen firm.  Finally, firms choose 
whom to hire amongst the pile of applications.  For a fraction, r, of the jobs employers 
prefer to hire a worker who has a job or is STU while for the rest of the vacant jobs 
employers are indifferent among all applicants.  Figure 1 illustrates the stocks and flows 




                                                 
12 An alternative is to call the LTU workers “stigmatized”. 
13 The model could easily be extended to a situation with an endogenous number of firms for example by 
imposing some kind of fixed cost.  
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Figure 1 An illustration of the stocks and flows in the model.
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   There are three basic micro-economic decisions that must be made every period: 
(i) the wage setting decisions made by the firms (ii) the decision whether or not to 
search made by every worker who is employed at the start of the period, and (iii) the 
hiring decisions made by the firms.
15  The following sections discuss these decisions 
starting with the last, and describe the general equilibrium outcome of the economy.  
 
Job Applications and Hiring 
On-the-job searchers and both types of unemployed workers search with the same 
intensity.  Every worker looking for a new job submits one application per period.   
Furthermore, the applications are sent to a randomly chosen firm.
16   
Since there are many more workers than firms in this economy, every firm 
receives a large number of applications.  The crucial assumption is that a firm always 
receives a sufficient number of applicants, so that every vacancy can be filled within the 
period from the pile of applications.  Therefore, the firm has to make a decision of 
whom to hire.  The following assumptions are made: (i) firms can observe whether the 
applicant is employed, STU or LTU, (ii) for a fraction of the jobs, employed and STU 
                                                 
14 The notation will be introduced in the sections below. 
15 The first two of these decisions are simplified versions of those analyzed in Eriksson and Gottfries 
(2000). 
16 This is of course a simplification of real world behavior but, at the same time, it receives some support 
in empirical work.  Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), point out that the time spent on search is fairly 
limited and does not seem to diminish with the duration of unemployment in the UK.  Blau and Robins 
(1990) show that, in a US sample, the search intensity differs little between employed and unemployed 
searchers.  Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), report estimates for the UK of between one and three 
applications being submitted per month. 
LTU  STU 
 E  
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applicants have identical training costs while LTU workers have higher training costs
17, 
(iii) all applicants are equal for the rest of the jobs, and (iv) the division of jobs between 
these two types is fixed.  In such a situation one would expect the employer to only 
consider hiring employed or STU workers for a fraction, r, of the jobs and choose a 




Every worker who remains employed has to decide whether to start on-the-job search or 
not.  It is assumed that both the wage levels and non-pecuniary factors matter for the 
decision whether or not to quit.
18  Let 
i
t w  and  t w  denote the wage in company i and the 
average wage respectively.  Each period every employed worker draws a number  t ν  
that determines his current job dissatisfaction from a random process with cdf G(ν) 
which is unimodal and has a mean smaller than unity.
19  The utility of a worker is the 
discounted sum of expected wages divided by the expected job dissatisfactions.  Since 
the worker is back in the same position the next period regardless of whether he changes 
jobs or not, only the current period payoff affects his decision.  The worker, therefore, 




t w ν / , with the 
expected utility from finding a new job  ] / [ ν λ t w E , where  1 < λ  represents the cost of 
switching jobs.
20  This means that there exists a cut-off value for 
i
t ν  for which the 
worker is indifferent between quitting and remaining in his present job.
21  It is assumed 
that  1 ] / 1 [ < ν λE ; i.e. given the same wage most workers prefer to stay in their present 
jobs.  The fraction of workers that searches on-the-job is given by: 
                                                 
17 That is, it is assumed that after the training all workers are equally productive in these jobs.  Also note 
that LTU workers never are employed in these jobs and no firm ends up paying the higher training cost.  
Therefore, this high training cost does not appear in the profit maximization problem. 
18 Akerlof, Rose and Yellen (1988) emphasize that non-pecuniary factors are as important as the wage 
levels for quit decisions 
19 The assumption that the worker makes an independent new draw every period is obviously a 
simplification of real world behavior.  It is motivated purely by the fact that the model, otherwise, would 
be overly complicated to solve since we would need to keep track of a distribution of workers with 
different levels of job satisfaction.   
20 Note that when making this decision, the worker knows the average wage level,  t w , but does not know 
the non-pecuniary factor associated with a new job. 
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Wage Setting 
Firms are assumed to face a hiring/training cost for every worker they hire implying that 
labor turnover is costly.
22  The hiring/training cost is given by a constant c times the 
average wage level  t w
23, the production function is given by  ) (
i
t t n F θ  where  t θ  
represents a shock factor, voluntary quits are sufficiently large to accommodate all 




t n denote the employment level of firm i period t,  t a  the probability to find a job for 
an employed/STU worker in period t and β  the discount factor.  The maximization 
problem solved by the firm is then 
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With first order conditions for period t given by 
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22 In practice, the prevention of excessive turnover seems to be important for real world firms and 
hiring/training costs appear to be substantial (see Blinder and Choi (1990) and Campbell and Kamlani 
(1997)). 
23 The average wage is used here to simplify the analysis. 
24 It is possible to explicitly incorporate uncertainty in the model and obtain the same results.  To keep the 
model simple this is neglected in this paper.  For details of how to model the wage setting with 
uncertainty see Eriksson and Gottfries (2000).  Here the timing of events are the following: the wage is 
set, the shocks are observed and then the hiring decisions are made.  
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The intuition behind the wage setting mechanism is that the firm finds it optimal to raise 
the wage until the marginal benefit of the reduction in turnover costs is equal to the 
marginal cost of increasing the wage.   
Note that it is assumed that the same wage is set for all workers.  This means 
that the firm cannot differentiate wages according to perceived productivity/training 
cost differences among workers.  There is some rigidity in the wage structure that 
prevents such wage differentials.  Such an assumption can be justified by fairness 
considerations, union influence or by arguing that for some other reason there exists a 




Consider a symmetric general equilibrium where all firms set the same wage ( t
i
t w w = ).  
This is the natural situation to analyze since all firms are assumed to be identical and, 
therefore, face the same wage setting problem.  Let  t n , 
S
t u  and 
L
t u  denote the aggregate 
levels of employment, STU and LTU respectively.  This gives us an equation for 
employment (from the first order conditions): 
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where Ω=-cS’(1), Ω being a measure of “wage pressure” due to the efficiency wage 
mechanism.
26 
Now  t a , the probability that an employed or STU worker gets the job he applies 
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25 See for example Akerlof and Yellen (1990) or Manning (1994) for a discussion about why a firm might 
not want to differentiate wages 
26 Intuitively, this factor might also include other factors that raise the wage like union influence.  See for 
example Gottfries and Westermark (1998) for a discussion of how to model this.  
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It consists of two parts; the probability to get a job for which ranking is used plus the 
probability to get a job for which ranking is not used.  Note that the number of vacant 
jobs consist of new jobs and existing jobs left unfilled after both exogenous and 
endogenous quits.  The first term consists of the fraction of jobs for which firms rank 
divided by the number of employed workers searching on-the-job, plus all STU 
workers.  The second term comprises the fraction of jobs the firm does not use ranking 
for divided by all applicants.
27  Equation (6) can be solved for  t a  to obtain 
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Let us now turn to the state variables in the model.  The two unemployment stocks 
evolve according to the following equations: 
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Equation (8) says that the current stock of STU workers consists of four components; 
the stock the previous period plus those becoming unemployed minus those finding a 
job minus those who fall into LTU.  Similarly, equation (9) says that the current stock 
of LTU workers consist of the stock the previous period plus those who become LTU in 
the period minus those who find a job.  Note that  t a  denotes the chance to get a job for 
a worker in the pool of STU and 
L
t a  denotes the corresponding chance for a LTU 
worker.  Using equations (8) and (9) in (5) gives us the following expressions: 
 
                                                 
27 Note that if q equals one we are back in the situation analyzed in Eriksson and Gottfries (2000); i.e. an 
employer that has a bias against all unemployed workers.  
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Substituting the expressions for  t a  and 
L
t a  into equations (10) and (11), we get an 
equation system which in principle can be solved for 
S
t u  and 
L
t u .  Analytically though 
this would be very complex since both  t a  and 
L
t a  are nonlinear functions of 
S
t u  and 
L
t u .  Further analysis of this system is therefore deferred to the numerical section below.   
 
Initial Effects of Changes in Parameters 
However, some further understanding of the model can be gained by combining 
equations (5) and (7) to a dynamic employment equation:     
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This equation is written out explicitly in Appendix 1 and gives the desired aggregate 
employment in the current period as a function of employment and STU the previous 
period.  Consider for a moment the intuition behind equation (12).  Employment 
dynamics arise because the optimal wage depends positively on the probability to get a 
job for an employed searcher.  Therefore, it is obvious that the employment level of the 
previous period matters.  The division of unemployment between STU and LTU also 
matters because if a larger fraction of the unemployed workers are in the LTU pool this 
results in a higher probability to get a job for on-the-job searchers.  This induces firms 
to raise the wage even more to keep their employees and, in equilibrium, the 
employment level falls.
28  
                                                 
28 Note that an individual firm perceives this probability as exogenous.  The only way for a firm to reduce 
turnover is by raising the wage to discourage search among its employees.  Since all firms are identical all 
firms have the same incentive, all wages rise, and employment falls.  
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Expression (12) cannot be solved for steady state employment since it contains 
two state variables but it is possible to ask, for a given number of 
employed/unemployed workers in the previous period, what are the effects of changes 
in the parameters on employment.  Clearly, this gives us only the initial effects but it 
does provide some useful intuition. 
First, one might be interested in the effect of ranking on the current employment 
level.  In Appendix 1 it is shown that 
 




nt .        ( 1 3 )  
 
In other words, if a larger fraction of the vacant jobs is reserved for employed and STU 
applicants we get a lower aggregate employment level.  If more jobs are reserved for 
the privileged group this will tend to increase the chance for employed workers to get a 
job.  To prevent costly turnover firms will then raise their wages, leading to lower 
employment.  
Second, consider the effects from faster skill loss among the unemployed, which 
in this model is captured by an increase in q.   In Appendix 1, it is shown that 
 




nt .       ( 1 4 )  
 
In other words, if the probability that an unemployed worker falls from STU to LTU 
increases this will tend to decrease aggregate employment.  This result holds only if 
some firms rank job applicants since the division of workers between STU and LTU 
would otherwise be irrelevant.  The intuition is that if q increases this implies a 
reduction in the pool of privileged job seekers.  This increases the probability to find a 





III Numerical  Analysis 
In order to gain some further understanding of the model, it is useful to set numerical 
values for the different parameters.  This makes it possible to solve the model for 
steady state values of employment, STU and LTU and look at how these variables are 
affected by parameter changes.  In addition, it allows us to study the dynamic 
adjustment process following both permanent and temporary shocks.  Choosing 
reasonable values for the parameters, we can get a sense of how large the effects are 
and how long the adjustment takes. 
 
Calibration 
In steady state the model contains the following five parameters: (i) the fraction that 
leaves employment for unemployment every period, s, (ii) the fraction searching on the 
job, S, (iii) the amount of wage pressure, Ω, (iv) the fraction of jobs for which firms use 
ranking, r, and (v) the risk that a STU worker faces of becoming LTU, q.  Although, 
estimates of several of these key parameters do not exist, it turns out that it is possible 
to use other facts about the labor market to deduce the values the parameters have to 
take for the steady state solution to be consistent with these facts.  To implement this 
strategy it must be decided which facts the model should be fitted against.  What is 
needed is at least as many facts as unknown parameters, and preferably some more to 
check the model against.  Table 1 presents values for the German economy (all steady 
state values).
29  Essentially, these facts are of two types; data about labor market stocks 
and flows and data about the probability to find a job for an unemployed worker at 
different durations of unemployment.  The details of the data are presented in Appendix 
2. 
                                                 
29 In view of the purpose of this paper it is natural to choose a typical European continental economy.  
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Table 1 Data for the German economy. 
Fraction of employed workers entering unemployment  s    0.005 
Fraction of employed job-to-job switchers  
E E x
→     0.005 
Employment  n    0.934 
Probability to remain unemployed after one month  
month   1 y     0.90 
Probability to remain unemployed after three months  
months   3 y     0.70 
Probability to remain unemployed after six months  
months   6 y     0.54 
Probability to remain unemployed after nine months  
months   9 y     0.44 
Probability to remain unemployed after twelve months 
months   12 y     0.36 
Fraction of all unemployed with duration <12 months  u u
months /
  12   <     0.51 
The outflow rate from unemployment  
E U x
→     0.076 
Fraction searching on the job (estimate for the UK)  S     ≈0.05
 
To be able to calibrate the model we need an explicit definition of a steady state.  It is 
natural to define it as a situation where all stocks remain constant.  In the context of this 
model this means that the numbers of employed, STU and LTU are kept constant.  Note 
that it is sufficient to write conditions that ensure that two of the stocks are kept 
unchanged to know that all three stocks remain constant.  Therefore, these conditions 
can be written in the form most beneficial to solving the model.  First, to ensure that 
employment is kept constant it is assumed that equation (5) satisfies: 
 
n n n t t = = −1 .        ( 1 5 )  
 
Furthermore, to keep the two stocks of unemployed workers constant it is sufficient that 
the flows in and out of STU remain equal.  This requirement can be written as: 
 
) )( 1 ( ) ( sn u q a sn u q sn
S S + − + + = .     (16) 
 
We also need a number of equations linking the facts in Table 1 to the theoretical 
model.  First, the fraction of employed workers switching jobs, 
E E x




→ .        ( 1 7 )  
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Second, the number of workers that at any given time have been unemployed for less 



























i months a a q snq a q sn u . (18) 
 
Third, the probability to remain unemployed after z months of unemployment, 
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Fourth, an expression for the outflow rate from unemployment, 
E U x
→ , can be derived.  
Since the outflow from unemployment must be equal to the inflow into unemployment 






→ .        ( 2 0 )  
 
The next step is to perform the actual calibration.  The facts reported with bold face 
numbers in Table 1 are used to calculate the values of the parameters identified above.  
The facts in the rest of the rows are then used as a check of the model.  The details of 
the calibration method are presented in Appendix 3.  This exercise yields the values 
summarized in Table 2.  
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Table 2 Calculated parameter values for the German economy. 
Parameter:    
Fraction of employed workers  falling into STU  s  0.005 
Fraction of employed workers searching on the job   S   0.048 
Wage pressure  Ω  9.706 
Fraction of jobs for which ranking is used  r   0.497 
Risk a STU worker faces of becoming LTU  q  0.056 
Implied variable value:    
STU 
S u   0.026 
LTU  
L u   0.040 
Probability to find a job for an employed/STU  worker  a  0.104 
Probability to find a job for a LTU  worker 
L a   0.041 
Risk of remaining unemployed after three months 
months   3 y   0.74 
Risk of remaining unemployed after six months  
months   6 y   0.56 
Risk of remaining unemployed after nine months 
months   9 y   0.44 
Fraction of all unemployed with duration <12 months  u u
months /
  12   <   0.49 
Outflow from unemployment 
E U x
→   0.07 
 
Looking at the parameter values in Table 2 it should be noted that none of them seem 
unreasonable.  Since there do not exist empirical estimates for several of them it is 
difficult to judge the accurateness of these values but the reader should note that the 
exact numbers are not important for the analysis.  Generally, what are interesting are 
the signs and rough magnitudes of the effects.  It should be noted that the calibration 
implies that employed and STU workers have around a two and a half times higher 
probability to find a job than those being LTU.   
 
Steady-state Analysis 
Using the parameter values in Table 2 it is possible to investigate the steady state 
effects of parameter changes.  Table 3 shows the effects of changing one parameter at a 
time by 20 per cent of its initial value.  
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Table 3 Steady state effects of 20 per cent parameter changes. 
  Base value  New value  STU  LTU  U 
Base  case      2.57 4.03 6.60 
r  increases r=0.50  r=0.60  2.52 5.82 8.34 
q  increases q=0.056  q=0.068  2.37 4.74 7.11 
Ω increases  Ω=9.71  Ω=11.65  2.86 5.81 8.67 
s  increases s=0.005  s=0.006  3.03 4.93 7.96 
S  increases S=0.048  S=0.058  2.57 3.91 6.48 
Ω/r increase  Ω=9.71/r=0.50  Ω=11.65/r=0.60  2.76 9.00 11.76 
Ω/q increase  Ω=9.71/q=0.056  Ω=11.65/q=0.068  2.60 6.92 9.51 
r/q  increase  r=0.5/q=0.056  r=0.60/q=0.068 2.31 7.05 9.36 
 
Now consider these results in detail.  First, if the degree of ranking in the economy 
increases we see that this results in substantial increases in LTU and total 
unemployment while STU remains essentially unchanged.  The result that total 
unemployment increases is expected from the previous discussion.  More ranking 
implies higher LTU for two reasons.  First, for a given number of jobs more ranking 
implies higher LTU since these workers face a decreased chance to find a job; fewer of 
the vacancies are open to them.  Second, more ranking has a negative effect on the total 
number of jobs in the economy and this also implies higher LTU.  Moreover, these two 
factors have opposite effects on the stock of STU and roughly seem to cancel each 
other out.   
Second, if the probability to become LTU for an unemployed worker increases 
we see that STU decreases while LTU and total unemployment increases.  As was 
discussed in the previous section, higher q leads to an increased chance to get a job for 
on-the-job searchers, upwards pressure on wages and lower aggregate employment.   
Turning to the STU it should be noted that there are two opposing effects at work here.  
First, higher q means an increased outflow from STU, which tends to decrease this 
stock.  Second, higher q means fewer jobs in the economy something that implies 
higher STU.  Using the calculated values it seems that the first effect dominates; higher 
q tends to reduce STU.  LTU on the other hand increases due to both of the mentioned 
effects.  
Third, if the degree of wage pressure increases all unemployment stocks 
increase.  It should be noted that the numerical analysis indicates a difference between  
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the effects of wage pressure and the degree of ranking in the economy.  More ranking 
implies that the whole increase in unemployment is concentrated to LTU.  More wage 
pressure, on the other hand, results in increases in both STU and LTU even though the 
effect on LTU is stronger. 
Fourth, an increase in the flow from employment to unemployment implies an 
increase in all unemployment stocks.  The reason is that a higher s implies more job 
vacancies, increased opportunities for on-the-job searchers, upward pressure on wages 
and lower employment.  It is natural that both stocks of unemployed workers increase 
since nothing really changes in the relation between STU and LTU.   
Fifth, an increase in the number of on-the-job searchers implies less LTU and 
total unemployment and essentially no change in STU.  More on-the-job searchers 
imply an increase in the number of searchers something that induces firms to reduce 
wages and employ more workers.  Again this does not really affect the relative position 
of those who are STU or LTU. 
Finally, it is interesting to look a little bit at how Ω, r and q interact.  The last 
three rows in Table 3 show that the effects of parameter changes are reinforced when 
we increase another parameter.  This can be seen by noting that the unemployment rate 
increases by more than the sum of the individual effects.  In other words, if skill loss 
and ranking are widespread in an economy this reinforces the negative employment 
effects of increased wage pressure etc. too. 
Before leaving the steady state discussion it is worthwhile to briefly look at 
differences in the effects of the various factors that might generate both persistence and 
long run effects; wage pressure, ranking and skill loss.  Intuitively, the different effects 
of these three factors can be understood by thinking in terms of survivor functions 
where surviving means remaining unemployed after different durations of 
unemployment.  This is illustrated in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2 An illustration of the different effects of r,q, and Ω. 
 
In Figure 2 the solid curve shows the survivor function with the calibrated parameter 
values.  The other two curves show what happens when either ranking or wage pressure 
are changed keeping all other parameters constant.  Here, the differences between 
changing the amount of ranking and changing the amount of wage pressure are 
apparent.  More wage pressure shifts the whole curve upwards implying that the 
probability to get a job declines at all durations.  More ranking on the other hand mostly 
harms those with long durations of unemployment.
30  
 
Dynamic Adjustment to Permanent Shocks 
A natural starting point for a dynamic analysis is to analyze what the adjustment path 
looks like after a permanent change in one or more of the parameters.  Since the inflow 
rate into unemployment seems to have remained virtually unchanged this means that 
we have three factors that potentially could have caused rising unemployment; skill 
loss, ranking and wage pressure.
31  The first two may result from more rapid 
technological advances or changes in the organization of firms that increase the skill 
requirements of individual workers.  The latter one may change as the result of 
increased training costs, more focus on keeping down turnover or increased union 
strength.
32  
                                                 
30 This also helps us understand the numbers falling out of the calibration.  The model is essentially 
calibrated using such a curve as an input and the curve used implies that the probability to leave 
unemployment declines with duration.  Since Ω cannot generate such an outcome r>0 and q>0 are 
needed. 
31 Evidence that s has remained essentially unchanged can be found in Layard, Nickell and Jackman 
(1991).  It is of course also possible that the extent of on-the-job search also has increased. 



































Let us start by investigating the effects of a permanent increase in the risk to 
become LTU for a STU worker (q).  This is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 The effects of a 50 per cent increase in q. 
 
Recall the discussion above where it was shown that an increase in q leads to lower 
STU and higher LTU with the net effect on unemployment positive.  In Figure 3 it is 
clear that these effects are present but we also see that the timing of the effects differ 
markedly.
33  The decrease in STU seems to occur during the first few periods while the 
increase in LTU is drawn out over a very long period of time.  The implication for an 
economy, that for some reason experiences an increase in the risk to become LTU, is a 
steady increase in unemployment for years to come.  These effects eventually die out, 
but the analysis indicates that it takes a very long time.  The effect might be even more 
severe if the economy suffers several increases in the LTU risk due to technological 
advances that increase the mismatch in the labor market. 
  Turning now to the effects of an increase in the degree of ranking one might 
expect the outcome to be similar; a substantial increase in LTU and smaller effects on 
STU.  Figure 4 shows the adjustment after an increase of r from 50 to 75 per cent.  
 
                                                 
33 It is interesting to look at the effects of an increase in q on the number of workers that have been 
unemployed for less than one year.  Using equation (18) gives us 
months u
  12   < =0.033; i.e. a slight increase.  
Remember that those workers, in the model, can be both STU and LTU even though most are STU.  An 
increase in q has three effects; the advantage to be STU increases, more workers fall into LTU and fewer 






























































































 Figure 4 The effects of a 50 per cent increase in r. 
 
Figure 4 shows that the effects from more ranking really are similar to those in Figure 
3.  The intuition behind this result is that r and q in some sense are substitutes; more 
discrimination against the LTU with the same inflow or a bigger inflow and the same 
amount of discrimination are somewhat similar in their effects.  However, two 
differences are worth noting.
34  First, if r increases this results in a nearly unchanged 
STU whereas an increase in q leads to a decrease in STU.  Second, the effect on LTU 
appears to be much stronger from ranking.   
Finally, let us turn to the consequences of an increase in the degree of wage pressure.  
Figure 5 shows what happens after such a change.  
                                                 
34 Another difference is the consequences for the number of workers that have been unemployed for less 
than one year.  Here, we get 
months u
  12   < =0.030; i.e. a slight decrease.  Remember that this stock contains 
both STU and LTU workers.  More ranking has three effects; the advantage to be STU increases, the 




























































































Figure 5 The effects of a 50 per cent increase in Ω . 
 
Recall the steady state analysis where it was shown that more wage pressure results in 
an increase in both stocks of unemployed workers.  That result is confirmed in Figure 
5.
35  However, note that the STU increase occurs during the first year whereas the LTU 
increase is much more substantial and drawn out.   
  To summarize these experiments it is obvious that the mechanisms analyzed in 
this paper can have strong effects on the unemployment level.  Quite moderate changes 
in the parameters can lead to a prolonged period of adjustment to a new equilibrium 
that entails a substantial change in the unemployment level.  It should also be noted that 
it is quite possible that real world labor markets have suffered permanent shocks that 
are a combination of the three types analyzed in this section. 
  An interesting question is whether these experiments can help us to understand 
the rise in European unemployment.
36  During the last decades both short- and long-
term unemployment have increased even though the increase has been particularly big 
in long-term unemployment.  This means that the relative incidence of long-term 
unemployment has increased substantially over time.
37  From Figures 3 and 4 it is clear 
                                                 
35 The consequences for the number of workers who have been unemployed for less than one year is now 
a substantial increase; 
months u
  12   < =0.037.  More wage pressure results in fewer jobs in the economy.  
Over time though the effects becomes concentrated to the stock of workers who have been unemployed 
for one year or more. 
36 It should be noted that STU and LTU in the model are not identical to short and long term 
unemployment in the data (see the discussion in Section II). 
37 For example, in Germany the incidence of long-term unemployment increased from around 30 per cent 



























































































that ranking and skill loss alone cannot explain what has happened since both short and 
long term unemployment have increased.  From Figure 5 we see that wage pressure 
affects both STU and LTU.  However, it is impossible to distinguish between different 
combinations of factors in a purely theoretical analysis.  What is needed to fully 
analyze this important question is data about the evolution over time of the probability 
to find a job at different durations and such data are not readily available.  Further 
empirical research is clearly needed to distinguish between hypotheses.  
 
Temporary Shocks  
We may also analyze what the dynamic adjustment path looks like after a temporary 
shock.  Let us start by stating the difference equations that determine the stocks of STU 
and LTU respectively.  Linearizing these equations and evaluating them in steady state 














t u u u 1 1 963 . 0 0494 . 0 − − + = .     (22) 
 
Consider first an increase in STU with one per cent.  According to these equations this 
implies an increase in STU the next period by 0.84 per cent as well as an increase in 
LTU the next period by 0.05 per cent.  The intuition is that firms are reluctant to cut 
wages since this would lead to costly turnover.  Hence, the employment level returns 
only slowly to equilibrium following a shock.  If LTU is one percent higher this implies 
an increase of LTU the next period by more than 0.96 per cent but has a small effect on 
STU the next period.  The explanation is the slow employment adjustment effect 
combined with the limited number of jobs open to LTU workers.  
Now let us look more closely at the adjustment back to equilibrium following a 
shock to unemployment.  As a first experiment let us study the effects of a temporary 
increase in the flow from employment to unemployment, s.
38 This experiment can be 
                                                 
38 This situation is analyzed with the assumption that all agents assume the change in s to be permanent.  
Otherwise the structure of the optimization problem would have to be changed to accommodate several 
different values of s.  
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motivated by the fact that a recession seems to be a fairly short period of high job 
destruction and the model equivalent of this is an increase in s.  To be concrete let us 
assume that s doubles for six periods and then returns to the original level.  Figure 6 
shows how the two stocks of unemployed workers are affected by such a shock. 
 
Figure 6 Adjustment back to equilibrium after a 6 months shock to STU. 
 
Figure 6 reveals several interesting facts.  First, STU increases during the period with a 
big inflow but then returns fairly quickly to its steady state value.  This is hardly 
surprising since employers perceive these workers to be equivalent to their present 
employees in all jobs.  Meanwhile, LTU initially increases slowly but instead continues 
to increase several periods after the shock and then only very slowly adjusts back to its 
steady state value.  This is the result of two forces; a bigger stock of STU workers 
implies a larger inflow into LTU for a number of periods and, in addition, employers to 
a large extent refuse to hire LTU workers, since they are perceived as more costly to 
hire than other applicants.  Total unemployment falls during the whole period after the 
shock but due to the lengthy adjustment path of LTU it takes some time for total 
unemployment to return to its pre-shock value; i.e. unemployment shows persistence 
(after 12 months around 40 per cent of the shock remains). 
One might expect more persistent effects from a shock that lasts longer since, in such a 
situation, more workers would fall into LTU.  Figure 7 shows what happens if the 












































































Figure 7 Adjustment back to equilibrium after a 24 months shock to STU. 
 
Since the shock lasts longer a larger number of workers fall into LTU and this results in 
a more drawn out adjustment back to equilibrium than in the previous experiment (after 
12 months around 50 per cent of the shock remains).  Similar results are obtained if we 
let the shock last for six months, as in Figure 6, but also let the risk to become LTU be 
twice as large.  This would correspond to a shock that involves more job destruction as 
well as an increased mismatch in the labor market.  Such a shock results in dynamics 
mainly involving LTU and, as expected, the outcome is a more drawn out adjustment 
process. 
The conclusion from this section is that the model implies persistence but that 
the degree of persistence depends on the nature of the shock.  A shock that involves a 
bigger inflow into unemployment for only a short period results in some persistence.  A 
more prolonged shock to this inflow or a short shock that affects both the inflow and 
the probability to become LTU results in more persistence.  Essentially, the key to 
getting a substantial amount of persistence is that the shock implies a substantial 
increase in LTU and not just STU.  Depending on the duration and type of the shock 
the model generates yearly persistence rates of 40-60 percent.  It should be noted 
though that the model cannot generate the near unit root persistence found in empirical 
studies of total unemployment time series.
39  At the same time it should be remembered 
                                                 
39 Empirical estimates of the serial correlation of unemployment series for Germany often find persistence 








































































that the model abstracts from several factors that probably also add to persistence such 
as wage contracts spanning several periods and overlapping wage contracts. 
 
IV Conclusions 
This paper investigates the consequences of skill loss as a result of unemployment.  
Unemployed workers risk losing some of their human capital every period and firms, 
who are unable to differentiate wages according to productivity/training cost 
differences, partly avoid hiring workers who have lost human capital.  Firms set a wage 
above the market-clearing wage to prevent costly turnover.  The paper then analyzes 
how such an economy responds to both temporary and permanent shocks. 
  It is shown that both an increased risk of losing human capital, an increased 
degree of ranking or more wage pressure result in higher steady state unemployment 
with the effects being concentrated to the stock of LTU workers.  Moreover, the 
negative employment effects of both skill loss and wage pressure increase when 
combined with ranking.  It is also shown that permanent changes in these key factors 
generate lengthy adjustment phases involving substantial effects on the employment 
level.  The numerical analysis indicates that it takes several years for the economy to 
reach the new steady state level even when the parameter change is quite moderate.  
  It is also shown that temporary shocks have persistent effects on employment.  
The amount of persistence depends on the type and duration of the shock but the model 
is not capable of producing the near unit root serial correlation found in empirical 
studies.  It should be remembered, though, that we are abstracting from several factors 
that might add persistence such as wage contracts that span several periods and 
overlapping contracts.  Another way to get more persistence is to allow for 
discrimination against all unemployed workers as in Eriksson and Gottfries (2000). 
  What conclusions can be drawn from this study about the high and persistent 
European unemployment rates?  The main contribution of this paper is the 
demonstration that if turnover considerations, skill loss as a result of unemployment, 
and inability to differentiate wages are important features of real world economies this 
will affect how the economies respond to both permanent and temporary shocks, 
resulting in lengthy adjustment phases involving substantial effects on the 
unemployment rates.  
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Appendix 1: Derivation of Selected Expressions 
Combining equations (5) and (7) the employment equation in (12) can be written as: 
 
) )( 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ) 1 ( 1 ( ) 1 (
) )( 1 ( ) 1 ( )) )( 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 )(( ) 1 ( 1 (






1 1 1 1 1 1 1









t t t t
S
t t t t t
t
u sn q r n s S n s n s r n s
u sn q n s rS u sn q Sn s r n s
u sn q r n s S n s r n s
n
− − − − − −
− − − − − − −
− − − − −
+ − − − Ω − − Ω − − − − Ω −
+ − − + + − + − − − −
+ − − + − + − − − Ω −
=
   
      ( A 1 )  
 
Differentiation of equation (A1) with respect to r and q respectively yields the 
following expressions (let N denote the numerator and D the denominator in (A1)): 
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Appendix 2: Data 
Here, the data used in the calibration is presented briefly.  First, we need to consider 
some conceptual questions and then go through the data in detail. 
In a real world labor market there exists at least three distinct states; employed, 
one or more groups of unemployed and out-of-the labor force (OLF).  In this paper the 
last group is left out to keep the model manageable and to focus attention on the central 
mechanisms.  In a more complete model of actual labor markets OLF force dynamics 
should be included. The exclusion of this stock can partially be justified by arguing that 
these flows merely represent the exchange of workers; i.e. workers being retired and 
being replaced by workers directly from school, parents taking child leave etc.  In 
addition, Blanchard and Diamond (1990) point out that the net flows to and from the 
labor force varies less than other flows over the business cycle.  This adds a bit of 
complication to the calibration since labor market data includes this stock with flows to 
and from it.  In this paper all flows from and to OLF are ignored. 
As already mentioned German labor market data for the period of the mid-
eighties are used.  Here follows a description of the data used. 
 
•  Fraction of employed entering unemployment (s).  Layard, Nickell and 
Jackman (1991), using OECD data, report a monthly inflow rate of 0.4 per cent 
of employment.  This figure is obtained by taking the number of unemployed 
with duration of less than one month. This excludes roughly half of those whose 
completed spell is less than one month.  To take account of this the fact the 
slightly higher value 0.5 per cent is used in the calibration. 
•  Fraction of employed job-to-job switchers (
E E x
→ ).  Here two possible sources 
of data have been found.  Burda and Wyplosz (1994) report that in 1987 0.3 per 
cent of those employed jump from job-to-job while Boeri (1999) report that the 
figure in 1992 is 0.7 per cent.  Here we assume that half of those hired are 
employed and use the figure 0.5 per cent in the calibration. 
•  Employment (n).  Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) report unemployment 
rates from OECD sources.  The average unemployment rate for the period 1985-
87 is 6.6 per cent.  
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•  Unemployed less than one year (
months u
  12   < ).  OECD (1993) report that 1986 
around 49 per cent of those being unemployed had been so for twelve months or 
more.  
•  Probability to remain unemployed for after 1, 3, 6, 9 and 12 months (
z y ).  Hunt 
(1995) report data from the public use version of the household-based GSOEP.  
Using data for the time period 1983-88 she calculates Kaplan-Meier survival 
curves.  From these figures it is clear that around 90 per cent remain 
unemployed one month after becoming unemployed.  Furthermore, 70, 54, 44 
and 36 per cent remain unemployed after three, six, nine and twelve months 
respectively.  The latter figures are obtained by calculating escapes only to 
employment while keeping escapes to OLF recorded as censored.  Since the 
model does not contain OLF dynamics it is that figure that is relevant here. 
•  The outflow rate from unemployment (
E U x
→ ).  OECD (1993) reports estimates 
of 7.6 per cent monthly for the year 1989.  It should be remembered though that 
this figure includes all flows from unemployment and therefore should be used 
with caution. 
•  Fraction searching-on the-job (S ).  Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), which 
report data for the UK from the Labour Force Study, say that around five per 
cent of those being employed do on-the-job search.  Since this is the only 
estimate available it at least gives a rough guide as to what value that can be 
considered reasonable.   
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Appendix 3: Calibration 
The objective of the calibration is to find a set of values for the unobservable 
magnitudes, { }
S u a q r S   ,   ,   ,   ,   ,  Ω , that satisfy the following equation system: 
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with the observable magnitudes, {}
months   12 month   1 E E   ,   ,   ,   ,   y y x n s
→ , set equal to their steady 
state values given in Table 1. 
Essentially, the equation system in (A4)-(A9) could be solved directly.  However, 
due to the complexity of this system an iterative method is used.  The algorithm used 
can be described by the following four steps. 
 
•  A value is set for the variable q. 
•  The system in (A4)-(A8) is solved for {}
S u a r S   ,   ,   ,   ,  Ω . 
•  The value of (A9) is calculated. 
•  A new value of q is chosen until convergence is achieved, i.e. (A9) is satisfied. 